Spontaneous Decisions and Free Will: Empirical Results and Philosophical Considerations by Rigato, Joana et al.
Spontaneous Decisions and Free Will: Empirical Results
and Philosophical Considerations
JOANA RIGATO,1 MASAYOSHI MURAKAMI,2 AND ZACHARY MAINEN2
1Center for Philosophy of Sciences of the University of Lisbon, Faculty of Sciences,
1749-016, Lisbon, Portugal
2Champalimaud Neuroscience Programme, Champalimaud Centre for the Unknown,
1400-038, Lisbon, Portugal
Correspondence: zmainen@neuro.fchampalimaud.org; mjrigato@fc.ul.pt
Spontaneous actions are preceded by brain signals that may sometimes be detected hundreds of milliseconds in advance of a
subject’s conscious intention to act. These signals have been claimed to reflect prior unconscious decisions, raising doubts
about the causal role of conscious will. Murakami et al. (2014. Nat Neurosci 17: 1574–1582) have recently argued for a
different interpretation. During a task in which rats spontaneously decidedwhen to abort waiting, the authors recorded neurons
in the secondary motor cortex. The neural activity and relationship to action timing was parsimoniously explained using an
integration-to-bound model, similar to those widely used to account for evidence-based decisions. In this model, the brain
accumulates spontaneously occurring inputs voting for or against an action, but only commits to act once a certain threshold is
crossed. The model explains how spontaneous decisions can be forecast (partially predicted) by neurons that reflect either the
input or output of the integrator. It therefore presents an explicit hypothesis capable of rejecting the claim that such predictive
signals imply unconscious decisions. We suggest that these results can inform the current debate on free will but must be
considered with caution.
In classical experiments on self-initiated actions in hu-
mans, Kornhuber and Deecke (1965) discovered a “read-
iness potential” that could be recorded from the scalp
electroencephalogram (EEG). In brain areas such as the
supplementary motor area (SMA), these signals appear as
slowly ramping activity starting as much as 1 sec in ad-
vance of a voluntary movement. Benjamin Libet et al.
(1983), in a now famous follow-up of this work, showed
that the agent’s conscious awareness of an intention to act
occurs much later—only 200 msec before the act itself
(Fig. 1). Although these experiments have been criticized
on empirical grounds, including the ability to accurately
measure the timing of conscious awareness (van de Grind
2002), similar results by other researchers have revealed
both single neuron and fMRI signals substantially preced-
ing spontaneous movements (Haggard and Eimer 1999;
Lau et al. 2004; Soon et al. 2008; Fried et al. 2011), in
some cases by several seconds (Soon et al. 2008).
This line of experiments (which we will hereafter refer
to as “Libet-type” experiments) has led to significant
attention and debate. Libet originally interpreted the ex-
periments as implying that decisions are made at an un-
conscious level and only later do they become available
to the conscious self. Given the usual demand that a free
decision be made consciously, this interpretation seems
to pose a grave threat to free will. But it has been greeted
with diverse opinions and arguments. Libet himself ar-
gued that free will existed but only in the possibility of
vetoing the action in that short gap between awareness
and movement (Libet 1985). In the field of social psy-
chology it was used to defend the claim that conscious
will is an illusion (Wegner 2002). In philosophy, the ten-
dency has been to diminish the relevance of Libet’s work,
even by philosophers who are skeptical about free will
(Dennett 1991; Levy 2014). Among thosewho defend the
existence of free will, Mele (2009, 2014a,b) has ques-
tioned the claims attributed to Libet’s experiments, argu-
ing that there is no proof that the readiness potentials are
identical to an intention to act and that the type of deci-
sions involved in these experiments is not representative
of the kinds of important decisions about which one
should care about free will.
Neuroscience may have something to contribute to this
debate, as it has been studying the neural basis of decision-
making for more than a decade (Gold and Shadlen 2007).
The psychology and neurobiology of simple perceptual
decisions such as discrimination tasks (Roitman and
Shadlen 2002;Wang 2002; Mazurek et al. 2003), reaction
time tasks (Hanes and Schall 1996), or simple value-based
choices such as choosing one of two food items (Krajbich
et al. 2010) have converged to a common if not consensual
mechanistic hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, de-
cisions are the result of the accumulation of evidence.
Evidence may correspond to sensory signals or to more
abstract variables such as subjective value.When a certain
evidence threshold or bound is reached, the decision for
the corresponding choice is made. Choices may corre-
spond to observable actions or commitments to act in
the future. Formal mathematical accounts of this sort are
referred to as “integration-to-bound” models.
Spontaneous decisions, like starting to move out of
one’s own initiative, have been less studied than evi-
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dence-based decision-making and may seem initially to
correspond to a different type of decision. Self-initiated
acts do have characteristics that might lie outside the nor-
mal issues addressed by decision models. A first issue is
how to account for the extreme unpredictability in the
timing of spontaneous actions. A second, and related, is-
sue is when there are not cues from the environment or
well-defined values at stake, what plays the role of “evi-
dence” driving the decision? Then most perplexingly, is
there room for a role for the “self” or agent in this model?
The primary aim of this review is to consider what
empirical results in neuroscience, by attempting to ad-
dress issues such as these, may have to say about the
nature of free will. The central reference will be the recent
work of Murakami et al. (2014), who presented new ex-
perimental evidence about the neural origins of sponta-
neous decisions in rats. We have taken as our mission the
nontrivial task of providing an account accessible to both
scientists and philosophers, without doing injustice to
either by oversimplification. Surprisingly, perhaps, we
will suggest that even studies in rats might be illuminating
to the case of freewill in humans. Nevertheless, great care
must be taken in making the leap from empirical data to
metaphysical conjectures.
Trial starts
Conscious intention to act;
remember clock position Raise the wrist
Report clock position at the time
of conscious intention to act
Figure 1. The spontaneous action generation task in Libet’s experiment (1983). A human subject is instructed to spontaneously flex
thewrist of his/her right hand at any timewhile looking at a clock-like visual display. After the trial, the subject reports the time he/she
became consciously aware of his/her intention to act. (Adapted fromHaggard 2008, with permission fromMacmillan Publishers Ltd.)
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Figure 2. Thewaiting task andwaiting behavior. (A) Schematic diagramof trial events in the ratwaiting task (top). In each trial, the rat is
required to wait for tone(s) and move to the reward port to obtain water reward. If the rat fails to wait for Tone 1 (T1), the reward is not
available. If the ratwaits forT1but leaves the port beforeTone 2 (T2), a small reward is available. If the ratwaits until T2, a large reward is
available. Probability distributions of the delays ofT1 (light green) andT2 (dark green) are shown in the inset. Time line of the taskevents
(bottom). The light green rectangle indicates presentation of T1; dark green rectangle, T2; light blue rectangle, reward. Tone 2 is
represented by a hatched rectangle to indicate it was not played in the impatient trials. (B) Snapshot of thewaiting behavior. Thewaiting
period in each trial is indicated by a gray bar. Light green ticks represent the presentation of T1; dark green ticks, T2. (C) Waiting time
histograms of short poke trials (gray), impatient trials (red), and patient trials (blue) for an example rat. The histograms show data pooled
across sessions. Inset: Cumulative histogram of waiting times in impatient trials from this rat. The arrow indicates the range from 10th to
90th percentile waiting times (DWT [0.1–0.9]), which represents the variability of waiting time for this rat. (D) Distribution of DWT
[0.1–0.9], which shows the variability of waiting time across rats. Filled bars indicate rats used in electrophysiology experiments.
(Adapted from Murakami et al. 2014.)
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SPONTANEOUS ACTIONS FROM
RODENTS TO HUMANS
Murakami et al.’s experiment went as follows (see Fig.
2). A thirsty rat initiated waiting by inserting its snout into
thewaiting port. Shortly thereafter, a first tonewas played,
after which the rat could garner a small amount of water
reward at the reward port. Alternatively, if the rat success-
fully waited for a second tone, played at a random delay, it
would get a larger reward.Of particular interestwere those
trials in which the rat responded between the first and
second tones. In those “impatient” trials rats sometimes
responded quickly, but often waited for a second or more
before leaving the port. These leaving decisions were said
to be “self-initiated” or “spontaneous” because of the high
variability in their timing despite otherwise identical
conditions.
The authors then recorded neuronal activity in the rat
secondary motor cortex. Of the 385 neurons recorded in
eight rats, 27 were identified as having “ramp-to-thresh-
old” activity, which means that their firing rate ramped up
during the waiting period, reaching a constant threshold
just before movement initiation (Fig. 3). Moreover, the
timing of threshold crossing was correlated with waiting
time in such a way that when the rat waited longer the
neurons’ firing rate ramped up more slowly. The charac-
teristic activity of these ramp-to-threshold neurons sug-
gested that they might serve as an internal trigger for the
behavioral response in the rat. An additional 64 neurons
were identified as “transient neurons,” because their ac-
tivity also correlated with the waiting time, but they fired
in a brief burst rather than a ramp (Fig. 4A). Remarkably,
these transient neurons fired in correlation with waiting
time even during a period extending to well over 1 sec
before the actual movement. Some of the transient neu-
ronswere positively correlatedwithwaiting time,whereas
others were negatively correlated (Fig. 4B,C).
To attempt to explain the relationships between the ob-
served electrophysiological recordings and the behavior, a
computational model was created (Fig. 5). In this “inte-
gration-to-bound” model, a set of transiently active
“units” constitute the input to the integrator, and the ramp-
ing neurons are taken to reflect the output of the integrator.
When the integrator crosses a certain positive threshold,
the decision to abort waiting is taken. Each input unit is
activated at a certain time point at a level that varies ran-
domly from trial to trial, matching the transient neuron
data. Each unit is assumed to connect to the integratorwith
a different positive or negative weight and therefore pro-
motes shorter or longer waiting accordingly.
This integration-to-bound model could parsimoniously
account for the data collected at both the neuronal and the
behavioral level. Most importantly, the properties of the
ramp-to-threshold neurons strongly resembled the output
of the integrator in the model, and the model could ex-
plain the correlation between both ramp-to-threshold and
transient neurons’ activity and waiting time. Moreover,
the authors noticed that if transient neurons were assumed
to fire independently from each other, the correlation of
each one’s activity with waiting time systematically de-
creased to zero as the number of transient neurons in-
creased. Instead, by introducing a common noise source
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Figure 3.Waiting time predictive activity of ramp-to-threshold
neurons. (A) Spike density functions (SDFs) of an M2 neuron in
different waiting time trials, aligned to poke-in and smoothed
with a Gaussian filter (SD ¼ 50 msec). Impatient trials are
grouped according to the waiting time, indicated by the color
scale. Dashed lines in SDFs indicate times when the rat already
left the port in some of the trials in that group. A threshold of 57
spikes/sec is indicated by the horizontal solid line. (B) Time to
cross a given threshold firing level as a function of mean waiting
time. The analyses with the highest and lowest thresholds with
significant correlation (57 spikes/sec, triangle, and 16 spikes/
sec, inverted triangle, respectively) are shown. Dashed lines
indicate the linear regression line for the time to cross a threshold
as a function of waiting time. The color represents the waiting
time group as indicated by the color scale in A. (Adapted from
Murakami et al. 2014.)
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Figure 4.Waiting time predictive activity of M2 transient neurons. (A–C) Spike density functions (SDFs) of threeM2 neurons. (A) An
M2 neuron that shows phasic activation at the beginning of waiting and whose firing rate is positively correlated with waiting time. (B)
An M2 neuron that shows sustained activation during waiting and whose firing rate is positively correlated with waiting time. (C ) An
M2 neuron that shows negative correlation between the firing rate and the waiting time. The format is the same as is in Figure 3A.
(Adapted from Murakami et al. 2014.)
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by which transient units became correlated with each
other, the contribution of each single unit became much
more significant, even at large population sizes. Interneu-
ronal correlations with the predicted magnitude were in
fact observed in M2, an independent measurement that
supports the merits of the model.
The integration-to-bound model suggests a critical per-
spective on the causal relationship between the two kinds
of neural data and the behavioral response. The causal
connection is mediated by the integrator circuit, which
can be thought of as analogous to a ballot system during
an election. Transient neurons are considered as input to
the integrator. They play the role played by sensory evi-
dence in perceptual decisions, “voting” for or against giv-
ing up waiting. Each one has some causal bearing in the
timing of the action, but none can be said to determine it.
The ramping neurons’ activity, considered as output of the
integrator, reflect a cumulative tally of votes. But if read
out at a level less than the decision threshold, the tally is
only suggestive and not determinant of an outcome. Even
a tally reaching very close to threshold might happen to
meander back away from it. The appearance of ramping is
a result of averaging of trajectories that hit the threshold.
The dynamics of individual trials are tortuous paths re-
flecting the random bombardment of votes both for and
against. The origin of trial-by-trial variability in behavior
is due to the variability in transient neurons’ firing togeth-
er with their strong interneuronal correlations.
With these data, Murakami et al. show the integration-
to-bound model to be a useful explanatory tool in relating
the timing of spontaneous decisions to the neuronal level,
providing a hypothesis about what is taking place in the
rats’ brains. We suggest that they can potentially inform
us about choices in Libet-type experiments as well. There
are different levels of comparison in which we can see the
parallels between the Murakami and Libet experiments.
First of all, the similarity of behavior: Spontaneous wrist
movements in humans and spontaneous waiting aborts in
rats are prima facie similar (although not identical) kinds
of “self-initiated” behaviors, and both occur with highly
unpredictable timing. The second parallel is the similarity
of shape and time course between ramping neurons’ ac-
tivity recorded in rat secondary motor cortex and readi-
ness potentials recorded over the homologous human
supplemental motor area (Fig. 6). Fried’s (2011) study,
showing something like ramping neurons in humans per-
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Figure 5. A schematic diagram of an integration-to-
bound model for spontaneous actions. In the model,
multiple input neurons (I) connect to one temporal in-
tegrator neuron (
Ð
) with variable synaptic weights (cir-
cles indicate inhibitory weights and triangles indicate
excitatory weights). Inset panels show activity of exam-
ple model neurons (top three panels are example input
neurons and the bottom left panel is an integrator neu-
ron, the same format as in Fig. 3A). (Adapted from
Murakami et al. 2014.)
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Figure 6.Ramping activity in human and rat motor cortex preceding spontaneous action. (A) An example EEG trace recorded from the
vertex cortex corresponding to the supplementary motor area. The EEG trace is an average of 40 trials, aligned to the movement onset
(solid vertical line). In this session, the subject felt a conscious intention to act, on average, 118 msec before the movement. A dashed
horizontal line indicates a hypothetical threshold line for the conscious intention to act. (Adapted from Libet et al. 1983.) (B) Example
single neuron activity recorded in rat M2 during spontaneous giving up trials. The trace is an average of 10 trials with the longest
waiting times (1.7–2.0 sec), aligned to the give-up time (solid vertical line). A hypothetical threshold line (dashed horizontal line) and
the time the activity crosses the threshold (dashed vertical line) are indicated. (Adapted from Murakami et al. 2014.)
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forming the Libet task, is also strongly suggestive of this
parallel. The third parallel is the applicability of the inte-
gration-to-bound model to describing the data. The case
for the rodent data has been made above. In the case of
Libet-type experiments, Schurger et al. (2012) have re-
cently made this case strongly at the behavioral level.
A final very intriguing parallel between the two sets of
experiments is the timing of threshold crossing in the rat
experiments and the moment of subjective intention to act
reported by Libet’s subjects (Fig. 6). Both occur at 200
msec before the movement. Accepting a similar set of
mechanisms between the two experiments, it could be
hypothesized that threshold-crossing corresponds to the
moment of decision both at the neural and the mental
level. Clearly, however, concrete evidence that thresh-
old-crossing of neurons with ramping activity corre-
sponds to the moment of awareness of decision, in one
species or the other, would be needed to justify this idea.
PHILOSOPHY AND NEUROSCIENCE
OF FREE WILL
The relevance of these results for the understanding of
free will, defined as the agent’s ability to control her
decisions and actions, may not be entirely straightforward
but we will argue for their importance nonetheless. Sim-
ilarly to the now common distinction between the easy
and the hard problems of consciousness (Chalmers 1995),
we believe it can be useful to distinguish “easy” and
“hard” problems of free will (Shariff et al. 2008). The
“hard” questions of free will are the ones that have typi-
cally concerned philosophers for 25 centuries and seem
to remain squarely out of reach by scientific experiments.
Can a person act freely in a deterministic world? (Aworld
is deterministic if, given a full description of all its ele-
ments and laws at t1, only one possible state can follow at
t2. This means that, given a certain cause, only one effect
can follow. A world is said to be indeterministic if this is
sometimes not the case.) Can anyone make sense of an
indeterministically caused action that is not random? In
other words, is it coherent to think that a person might
make a decision based on reasons and still have the pos-
sibility to act otherwise given the exact same circum-
stances and laws of nature?
In contrast, the “easy” problems are in principle scien-
tific in nature, and today’s neuroscience can contribute at
least to illuminating the empirical aspects that are related
to these issues. Is the variability that we perceive in the
behavior of biological systems originated within the or-
ganisms themselves or is it just the deterministic output of
undetectable changes in the environment? Do we have
evidence that brain processes at the neuronal level are
sensitive to genuine indeterminacy originated at a more
fundamental level (the quantum domain, say)? What do
we know about how the brain weighs alternatives and
decides what to do when facing different possibilities of
action?What does Libet’s readiness potential represent in
the psychological process of decision-making? What is
the neural basis of the self who endorses the decision?
The relationship between themental level, where delib-
eration is described in terms of beliefs and desires, and the
neuronal level, where scientists measure spikes per sec-
ond, has been and remains an object of great debate in
philosophy. However, no one denies that what can be
provisionally proven or disproven about the brain must
be somehow taken into account when we speak about
the mind. It is generally accepted that the mind “super-
venes” on the brain: That is, that there cannot be changes at
themental levelwithout there being corresponding chang-
es at the neural level. This is not considered a strong thesis,
as it regards only the interdependence of mind and brain,
not their nature nor how one produces the other, but it is
enough to justify the importance of understanding how the
physiological substrate works in order to know the limits
of what philosophers are entitled to conjecture. It would
be pointless to argue for the philosophical plausibility of a
certain account of free will if its empirical commitments
were totally implausible from a scientific point of view.
However, one must be aware of several aspects of the
philosophical concept of free will before purporting to
infer any conclusions from what is possible to observe
in experiments such as this one.
First of all, the philosophical literature about free will
has intricately associated it with moral responsibility
(Strawson 1962; Kane 1996; Pereboom 2001, 2014). To
consider that to be free is to be fit for responsibility attri-
butions is the standard way of framing the problem of free
will, and one that only occasionally has been called into
question (Steward 2012). In contrast, experiments such as
Libet’s or Murakami’s have obviously nothing to do with
morality. Yet, we believe morally neutral decisions are
just as relevant for the debate as any other, for what mat-
ters for free will is the agent’s control over her choice or
her lack thereof.
Second of all, the idea that free will is an exclusively
human ability is often taken for granted from the start
(Clarke 2003), and that of course would prevent us from
considering that animal models can provide us with any-
thing other than evidence for the evolutionary antecedents
of this privilege of ours. We do not favor this view, how-
ever, for there is no obvious reason why this should be
taken for granted from a scientific standpoint. Even if
there are relevant differences, we are likely to learn some-
thing about our situation from the evolutionarily common
aspects we share with other animals.
Moreover, when trying to use these studies as argu-
ments in the philosophical debate about free will, one
must be very careful with terminology.What philosophers
call “reasons for action” neuroscientists call “evidence”;
what philosophers call “intentional,” neuroscientists call
“goal-directed”; and, most importantly, while philoso-
phers (in the context of this debate) take “decision” to
mean a conscious and active formation of an intention to
act, usually following a deliberative process, neuroscien-
tists apply the term both to the commitment made after
some sort of reasoning in the case of evidence-based de-
cisions and to more general mechanisms of settling an
indeterminate matter, such as where to turn the head. It
is also important to note that, in simple “decisions,” the
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indeterminacy that precedes choicemay be only epistemic
(i.e., it may depend only on the contingent limitations of
an external observer’s knowledge of the stimulation). In
fact, the problem of determinism, from an empirical point
of view, is mainly an epistemic issue, whereas the sort of
indeterminism that philosophers consider important is
also ontological (i.e., it regards the underlying nature of
reality). Also for that reason, philosophers and neurosci-
entists tend to be talking about different things when dis-
cussing these matters.
PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS
OF MURAKAMI’S RESULTS
Reinterpreting Libet’s Readiness Potential
The arguments based on Libet-type cases typically use
as a premise the fact that an unconscious ramping activity
at the neuronal level is correlated with the decision made
consciously by the agent in such a way that we are able to
predict that decision to some degree. Since Libet et al.
interpret the readiness potential as part of the decision,
they suppose this observation to mean that the decision
was unconsciously made by the agent’s brain, which be-
comes aware of it only some time later. The gap between
the start of the brain’s predictive activity and the subjec-
tive awareness of the urge to move is said to be as long as
10 sec in some of the experiments (Soon et al. 2008). This
is considered to undermine free will because it is hard to
see how the agent might control what she is not aware of.
In the above experiment,Murakami et al. defend amod-
el according to which the ramping activity of neurons re-
flects the accumulation of input in favororagainst acertain
spontaneous action, to which the agent is decisively com-
mitted only when a certain threshold is crossed. Until that
moment, the action might be predicted with a certain de-
gree of accuracy, like election polls, but the outcome is
open until the very last moment when the decision is
made—that is, when threshold is crossed, and overt action
takes place immediately after. The authors hypothesized
that the rampingactivityof the integrator,which in the case
of the waiting task in rats is reflected in the ramping neu-
rons in the secondary motor cortex, is, in Libet’s experi-
ment, reflected in the slowly building readiness potential.
This model and its use in Murakami’s experiment
fleshes out what Alfred Mele (2014b) has argued when
discussing putative neuroscientific evidence that free will
is just an illusion: “when the rise starts about half a sec-
ond before the muscle burst in the main experiment, the
beginning of the EEG reading—or the first half of it—is
correlated with something that precedes an intention rath-
er than with an intention itself” (Mele 2014b, p.19).
Free Will in Rodents?
The relevance of experiments with rodents for the de-
bate around human free will might be called into question
by philosophers who would maintain that free will is a
specifically human feature. But so far evidence has con-
firmed the success of integration-to-bound models in ex-
plaining simple evidence-based decisions not only in
nonhuman primates and in humans, but also in rats and
even in invertebrates (e.g., DasGupta et al. 2014), consis-
tent with a wealth of biological data arguing for evolu-
tionary continuity in biological systems. With the present
data, Murakami et al. added a further argument for ex-
tending the case from perceptual or value-based judg-
ments to self-initiated actions. So, from rats to monkeys
to humans, the same type of process seems to take place
when simple decisions are made, both when they are
based on evidence provided by the environment and
when they are spontaneously made.
From Waiting Tasks to Rational Decisions
Another question has to do with the relevance of this
type of task, given that, in the philosophical literature, free
will is taken to be the agent’s ability to control a choice
that is made for reasons.What philosophersmean by “rea-
sons” in this context are beliefs and desires, and it may not
be entirely clear how such reasons translate into factors in
spontaneous decision tasks. In humans, these tasks typi-
cally involve apparently arbitrary urges. Agents are usu-
ally asked to flex their wrists or press a button whenever
they feel like it, and they are explicitly instructed not to
plan their action in advance. There is no extrinsic reason
why it should be preferable to flex the wrist now rather
than later, apart from maybe boredom or the intention to
keep a random pattern. It may thus be objected that Libet-
type experiments do not probe the right kinds of decisions
because they are without reasons.
With respect to this issue, Murakami’s task and inter-
pretation would seem to help the case for relevance. Mur-
akami’s rats had conflicting motivations related to the
content of the decisions themselves: the desire to drink
plus the certainty of the small reward versus the possibility
of a larger reward, despite the inconvenience of having the
snout poked in while waiting for the delayed tone. One
could thus argue that their experience is more closely
related to the human decisions that philosophers discuss
as free than to the tasks that have been tested in Libet-type
experiments. And the fact that the rats hesitated before
leaving the waiting port in impatient trials, while moving
promptly in patient trials, was evidence for how much
they had learned the task and understood what could be
expected. In other words, one can argue that subjects in
Murakami’s waiting task did have beliefs—that water
would be delivered in the reward port, that a larger amount
would be given if theywaited for the second tone—aswell
as desires—above all, the desire to drink. Therefore, their
decisions were not random but made for reasons. On the
other hand, although these reasons are clearly relevant to
the rats’ behavior in general, they do not necessarily dic-
tate the precise timing of giving up in a particular trial,
which varies substantially and randomly even given ap-
parently similar level of thirst and so on. Thus, the precise
moment of giving up in a particular timewould seem to be
a less-reasoned decision, much as is argued for the Libet
experiments.
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Dual Theories of Decision-Making
The main trend in neurobiology is to assume that “the
path from simple decisions to complex ones may be more
straightforward than it appears” (Gold and Shadlen 2007,
p. 562). However, further evidence that the integration-to-
bound decision model applies to truly “deliberative” de-
cision-making may be needed in order to more reliably
move on to the sort of cases philosophers enjoy discuss-
ing. Are rapid perceptual decisions truly representative of
the process by which, for instance, a human agent decides
to change jobs and move with her family to a different
city? Is the rational, abstract, and linguistically mediated
consideration of reasons in this case just a more complex
version of what animals such as Murakami’s rats experi-
ence? It has indeed been argued that complex human
choices, like deciding to marry someone, are at a different
qualitative level with respect to more simple ones. In par-
ticular, Kahneman’s defense (2011) of a two-systems ap-
proach to judgment and choice in which a fast, automatic,
and often unconscious System 1 is distinguished from the
slow, effortful, and controlled System 2, has a long and
influential history in psychology (Tversky and Kahneman
1974; Kahneman et al. 1982; Gigerenzer et al. 1999). In
the context of moral psychology, a dual-process theory
has also been proposed (Greene et al. 2004), suggesting
that competing subsystems (emotional versus cognitive)
in the brain are responsible for moral judgments under
different situations.
It is tempting to think that decisions based on deliber-
ation aremore likely to be free than rapid choices based on
“gut,” in the sense that the longer process of weighing
different reasons, such as very abstract ones like moral
questions, seems to allow for more control by the agent’s
conscious self than an automatic mechanism. However,
processes underlying System 1, despite being, by defini-
tion, not conscious or effortful, are associated with expe-
riences of agency and choice, just like the ones underlying
System 2. Also, there is not yet any evidence for such a
dichotomy at the neurophysiological level (Sugrue et al.
2005),whichwould be fundamental given our assumption
of the supervenience of the mind on the brain. Moreover,
we do not have reasons to believe a putative deliberative
system would be less deterministic than its counterpart
based on fast heuristics.
All or Nothing at All
The questions raised by the differences between Mur-
akami’s rats and human agents undergoing complex
deliberative processes remind us how the use of neurosci-
entific results in philosophical discussions about free will
needs to be conducted with caution. However, one thing
that becomes clear when we review the results from this
experiment and others is that the same integration-to-
bound model that has successfully been applied to simple
decisions in humans and monkeys allows for a parsimo-
nious explanation in the case of rats and, most probably,
in the case of Libet-type subjects. So the similarity be-
tween the neural patterns in all these cases makes it likely
that either there is a continuity between all of them and
themore complex cases considered by philosophers when
discussing free will, or none of them is relevant for the
discussion—Libet cases included.
CONCLUSIONS
The integration-to-bound model and the evidence pro-
vided by Murakami et al.’s results of its general applica-
bility to situations of self-initiated decisions in biological
systems is a good challenge to the common idea that
neuroscience is inimical to free will. In cases of human
actions, it provides us a hypothetical explanation for the
timing of the phenomenological experience of conscious
decision, identified as the moment of threshold crossing
within the integrator mechanism. At the same time,
and importantly, it accounts for the existence of causal
antecedents that make one decision or another more like-
ly. The outcome is neither inevitable beforehand nor
random.
Some free will defenders argue that Libet-type exper-
iments are not representative of the sort of situations that
are typically under discussion in the philosophical con-
text. We believe this argument is open for discussion, but
if Murakami and his co-workers are right, it is actually
irrelevant. Libet’s threat to free will has been overrated
simply because it wrongly assumed that because a choice
is preceded by a signal it follows that a signal is always
followed by a choice. Instead, even though the choice can
be forecast, it remains open until decision is made. To-
gether with growing consensus in favor of an inner source
of variability in biological systems (Brembs 2011), these
results leave the door open even for the most demanding
indeterministic accounts of free will.
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